Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold On the Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the Untied Nations From the Floor of the U.S. Senate May 26, 2005 Mr. FEINGOLD: Mr. President, I rise to oppose the confirmation of John Bolton to be the next United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. President, I do not take this decision lightly. When Mr. Bolton's nomination was first announced, my vote was by no means a foregone conclusion. In 2001, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered the nomination of Mr. Bolton to be the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, I parted company from my Democratic colleagues on the Committee to vote in favor of his nomination, both in Committee and on the floor. I did so because I generally believe that the President has the right to choose executive branch nominees who share his overall worldview, even when I do not share that worldview. Barring serious ethical lapses or a clear lack of appropriate qualifications for a given job, I tend to give the President a great deal of latitude in making these appointments. But after examining the record, I have concluded that Mr. Bolton is fundamentally unsuited for the job to which he has been nominated. His blatant hostility toward the institution at which he would serve and his history of pursuing his personal policy agenda while holding public office lead me to question whether Mr. Bolton's appointment as our Ambassador to the United Nations would serve U.S. interests. I share the views of many who are insisting on reform at the UN. The UN must become more effective and more accountable, and as stewards of the American taxpayers' dollars, we must insist on this point. But Mr. Bolton's record suggests that his personal animosity toward the United Nations is so great that he cannot effectively lead the charge for reforms that can make this vital but deeply flawed institution stronger and more effective. He seems to view the UN as an instrument to be used when it suits only our immediate interests, but one best ignored or even undermined the rest of the time. His failure to grasp the give-and-take required for effective multilateralism makes him a real obstacle to any hope of pursuing vital long-term U.S. interests in increasing burden-sharing and marshalling a global force strong enough to defeat the terrorist networks that seek to do us harm. Mr. Bolton's record reveals many instances of intemperance and rash decision-making. At least two senior intelligence officials told Committee staff that Bolton's draft testimony prepared for a House hearing on Syria in 2003 went well beyond what the intelligence community could clear. This wasn't a case in which State Department intelligence analysts alone had concerns about Bolton's proposed language. The CIA, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all objected, and according to interviews conducted by the Committee staff, Bolton's office "pushed back," resisting the intelligence community's efforts to alter problematic provisions. Bolton was determined to be such a loose cannon that the Deputy Secretary of State instituted an extraordinary policy to address the problem, requiring all of Mr. Bolton's public presentations to be cleared by Larry Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff, or Deputy Secretary Armitage himself. I do not have confidence that his personal agenda would always be subordinated to that of the Secretary of State, who, in testimony before this Committee and in her first days in office, has placed such a premium on restoring frayed diplomatic ties. In addition, Mr. President, information that came to light during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this nomination indicates that John Bolton has sought to punish intelligence analysts whose assessments did not support what Mr. Bolton wished to say. After all that has happened to our country's reputation and credibility in recent years, we cannot afford to tolerate -- let alone, promote -- a policy-maker who seeks to silence dissent from the intelligence community. What the Committee found, Mr. President, was not that Mr. Bolton made careless remarks in the heat of a tough bureaucratic dispute. The evidence shows that over a period of many months, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of a respected intelligence analyst at the State Department who had raised concerns about language Mr. Bolton wished to use publicly in the course of the standard clearance process -- a process that is there to protect against misleading or inaccurate public characterizations of important security issues. And Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, again pursuing this vendetta for months, not heated minutes, and going so far as to consider blocking country clearance for Mr. Smith to travel abroad. In both cases, the offense that so incensed Mr. Bolton appears to be that the analysts did their jobs -- they presented the facts as they saw them, and declined to keep silent when the facts did not support what Mr. Bolton wished to say. And in both cases, senior officials with decades of experience in government who were involved in these episodes told Committee staff that Bolton's actions -- his attempts to retaliate against these analysts - were absolutely extraordinary. In addition to these disturbing incidents, other interviews conducted by Committee staff revealed a broader pattern of attempting to simply cut those who disagreed with his policy views, or those who he believed disagreed with his policy views, out of the policy-making process entirely. John Wolf, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation, told Committee staff that Bolton attempted to retaliate against at least two public servants in the Non Proliferation bureau because of differences in their policy views. Mr. Bolton tried to remove a State Department attorney from a case relating to a sanctions issue because of perceived policy disagreements -- the record suggests that Mr. Bolton actually misunderstood where the lawyer in question stood -- and went so far as to suggest that he would not work with the State Department's entire legal bureau on the matter from that point on -- a declaration quickly negated by Deputy Secretary Armitage, who felt compelled to remind Bolton that as a State Department official, he would indeed be working with the State Department's lawyers. This kind of tunnel-vision, everyone-else-out-of-the-room approach was summed up Secretary of State Powell's Chief of Staff Larry Wilkerson, who told the Committee staff, "when people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing with [North Korea's nuclear weapons development] in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it bothers me, as a diplomat, and as a citizen of this country." When asked specifically if he thought that Mr. Bolton had done that, Wilkerson said, "Absolutely." Mr. Wilkerson ended his interview with the Committee with the following: "I would like to make just one statement. I don't have a large problem with Under Secretary Bolton serving our country. My objections to what we've been talking about here -- that is, him being our ambassador at the United Nations -- stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that have to be led; they have to be led well, and they have to be led properly. And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up there, you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year. Second, I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, "brilliance," unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans, who said, "98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next day," and had no willingness -- and, in many cases, no capacity -- to understand the other things that were happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations. And that's the only reason that I said anything." Some have suggested that, because Mr. Bolton did not succeed in his attempts to end the careers of analysts whose dissenting views angered him, and because he did not succeed in his attempts to manipulate the government's processes to shut out voices of disagreement, caution, or dissent, there is no problem here. I cannot believe that any of my colleagues actually believes that is true -- not after all that we have learned about the vital importance of dissent in the intelligence community from the 9/11 Commission, the Silberman-Robb Commission, and numerous other investigations into the major intelligence failures that have gravely harmed our credibility and our security over the past years. Why would we choose to promote to a position of prominence and trust an individual who has repeatedly tried to suppress inconvenient analysis? As the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council told the Committee staff, politicization, "even when it's successfully resisted, it doesn't mean that there hasn't been an effect, because it creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging." Carl Ford told this Committee about his concerns of a "chilling effect" that Bolton's actions with regard to Mr. Westermann could have on all of the analysts in the Department's intelligence analysis bureau. And Mr. Westermann told the Committee staff that in the wake of his run in with Mr. Bolton, "I was concerned that I had to spend time thinking about how I was approaching issues so that I didn't step on a landmine." Attempting to undermine important clearance processes, attempting to run roughshod over the safeguards in place to protect U.S. credibility, is an awfully big problem, whether or not the attempt was successful. It is, in my view, a disqualifying problem. Finally, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to examine the record of the Foreign Relation Committee's consideration of this nomination. It raises very serious concerns regarding Mr. Bolton's understanding of his obligations to be forthcoming with this Committee. Several of Mr. Bolton's answers to Senators' questions were misleading at best, and several were quite blatantly non-responsive. A number of these instances relate to Mr. Bolton's efforts to retaliate against intelligence analysts, and these are detailed in the minority report on this nominee. But others relate to more general foreign policy issues. The Bush Administration's first Ambassador to South Korea, Tom Hubbard, was so troubled by Mr. Bolton's misleading characterization of Mr. Hubbard's role in approving a controversial speech that Mr. Bolton gave in Seoul that he felt obligated to contact the Committee to correct the record. In light of the evidence this Committee has seen in recent weeks, most of us can probably agree that if Mr. Bolton does end up being our next Ambassador to the UN, extremely careful oversight will be required. But our oversight responsibilities depend, in many instances, on the executive branch officials who come before us understanding that they have a constitutional obligation to be forthcoming with Congress. The record that he has amassed during this confirmation process gives me no confidence that Mr. Bolton intends to adhere to this obligation. Mr. Bolton's nomination raises fundamental questions regarding both credibility and accountability. The credibility of our representation at the UN, the credibility of intelligence, the credibility of the oversight process are at stake. And the question of whether or not this Committee will hold officials who seek to suppress dissent accountable for their actions is before us today as well. I deeply appreciate the extraordinary courage of the many people who came forward to share with the Foreign Relations Committee their own concerns about Mr. Bolton's fitness for the UN post or to correct inaccuracies in the record -- in some cases at real risk to their own careers. I am grateful for their efforts, and deeply appreciate their honesty. I hope that my colleagues will consider their words carefully. Their statements came at a price to them, and they should not be ignored. In contrast to these admirable public servants -- many of whom, by the way, I would likely disagree with on any number of important policy issues -- the Administration has failed to be forthcoming in this process. Mr. President, I share the concerns that have been expressed by some of my colleagues on the Committee regarding the Administration's failure to respond satisfactorily to requests for documents and information relating to this confirmation. The Administration declined to produce requested documents and information, apparently because they do not believe the requested information is relevant. Quite frankly, that is not for the Administration to determine. Not only does the Administration's rationale fail to respect the Congress as a co-equal branch of government, it also speaks of bad faith and contempt for the role of Congress in the confirmation process. Finally, Mr. President, during the Committee's consideration of this nomination, Senator Sarbanes reminded all of us of the history of the position of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. He listed the names of all twenty-four public servants who have held the office. Twenty-two of those twenty four were confirmed by unanimous consent, or with unanimous votes, or with voice votes. One was confirmed by a vote of 89 to 3. The most controversial Ambassador in our history was confirmed by a vote of 81-16. We have been represented by some very direct, opinionated, colorful characters at the United Nations. But we have never sent a figure so polarizing, or one with credibility so tattered, as the nominee before us today. John Bolton does not have the support of a single Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He does not have the support of a majority of that Committee. I do not understand why the Administration is insisting upon thrusting such a troubled nominee into such a sensitive and important post. From achieving real reform of the UN to rebuilding US credibility to creating a solid global coalition to combat terrorism, the stakes at the UN are as high as they have ever been. If the President had chosen a public servant of impeccable judgment, the Committee and the Senate would have rallied around that selection, eager to work in partnership with a nominee capable of, and committed to, mending frayed relationships, encouraging real burden-sharing, and nurturing a strong international coalition to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. John Bolton is not that nominee. I urge my colleagues to reject this nomination, and let us work together to quickly confirm a different nominee -- one who represents the President's views but also has the skills, the record, and the confidence of the Senate required to be an effective Ambassador. We can do, and we should do, much better than John Bolton. I yield the floor.

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