FEINGOLD:  I thank the chairman very much for holding this hearing.  Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for coming before the committee.  As you know, I was just delighted when the president and the secretary of state had the wisdom to select you to be the special envoy on this issue.  And I give the chairman enormous credit for that lunch the other day.  It was one of the most unique things in my near- 17 years that I've been watching these things and I saw the fingerprints of Dick Holbrooke all over that very unique event that I thought was just excellent.

Now it has been nearly eight years since Al Qaida attacked the United States.  And while I'm very pleased that President Obama has unequivocally recognized the need to refocus the government's attention and resources on this threat, I do remain concerned that the plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan has the potential to escalate rather than diminish the threat.

Since 2001 as you pointed out, Pakistan has received millions of dollars from the United States and assistance packages and reimbursements for security related counter terrorism initiatives. And yet Al Qaida has really reconstituted itself along the border region primarily because the last administration focused its attention on Iraq and relied on a partner in Pakistan who lacked popular support and who's commitment to fighting extremism was questionable.

Fortunately, President Obama wants to reverse the previous administration's failed policies.  Good intentions are not enough, however.  As the president and the secretary of state have made clear, security in Afghanistan and Pakistan and even for us here at home are inextricably linked.

Now, adding 21,000 new troops in Afghanistan I fear could further destabilize Pakistan without providing substantial lasting security improvements in Afghanistan.  Your very words here this morning, Mr. Ambassador, were "we pushed them to the east."  The question here is are we going to continue to push more people to the east who may be more able to do us harm in Pakistan than they're able to do us harm in Afghanistan.

So obviously, as you know better than anyone, to succeed we must ensure that we have an equal partner in the Pakistani government.  If we're serious about fighting Al Qaida and preventing another generation of Bin Laden's from emerging, we must also ensure that any expanded support for development, rule of law, human rights and anti corruption is met with equal dedication by the Pakistani government.

And along these lines, Mr. Ambassador, I'm interested to hear from you today about how we can help ensure a coordinated and effective response to the rising numbers of displaced people that have resulted form the recent military offensive in the western part of Pakistan which of course we all know we're not talking here about FATA.  We're talking about Pakistan proper, we're talking about internally displaced people.

And as you know from our previous conversations, less than a year ago I had the opportunity to see the good effects of American aid in both the Northwest Frontier Province and in Pakistani Kashmir after the earthquake.  Now we can't have a foreign policy based on waiting for natural disasters.  However, when one does occur, we've seen both in the Tsunami incident in Indonesia in that region and also here in Pakistan that that is something we can do and do quickly that can make a difference.

So I urge you to consult with people in the administration to help make that happen.  I'm also pleased that Senator Kerry and Lugar have reintroduced an updated legislation to strengthen Pakistan civilian government; that is overdue.  And I'm also pleased to see that the legislation will require the secretary of state to be forthcoming on what progress is occurring as a part of our oversight. After all, this does obviously involve taxpayer dollars.

Now back to the issue, Ambassador, of what you just said, that everything that happens in Afghanistan effects Pakistan. Well, that's -- that gets at the core of my -- some of my concerns.

Is the proposed policy sufficiently considering the -- what I like to call the balloon effect of whatever happens in Afghanistan affects Pakistan or vice versa?

You've said that the impact of our troops in Afghanistan will mean the Taliban will, quote, "go east into Pakistan" towards the Baluchistan area, an issue that has to be addressed.

So I'm curious about your reaction to -- do you believe the Pakistani government is doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, particularly in Baluchistan?

And are we sure that when we -- 21,000 more troops in Afghanistan -- get up to a level of 70,000 troops, are we sure that that isn't making the situation in Pakistan potentially worse, or is -- or is -- or actually making it better?  Could it -- is it possible that it's going to be having the kind of negative effect that you've actually alluded to in your remarks?

HOLBROOKE:  Thank you, Senator Feingold.  On your first point, you're absolutely correct that -- that an additional amount of American troops, and particularly if they're successful in Helmand and Kandahar, could end up creating a pressure in Pakistan which would add to the instability.  I raised that issue as soon as the troop discussions began at the White House, and I was not alone in raising it.

The United States military command under General David Petraeus, who I think is great American military leader, is well aware of it. They have been conducting and are conducting as we speak very intense discussions with the Pakistani army to work with them so that they will be prepared this time, as they were not prepared in 2002, for what happened.

On your key question, is Pakistan doing everything it can to capture Taliban leaders, Al Qaida and so on, you -- you heard, as I did, General Pasha's reply in closed session to that question in the lunch we discussed earlier.

I don't know the answer to that, because I don't know what it is they're not doing that they could be doing.  They have captured over -- and killed and eliminated over the years a good number of the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaida, but others have been under no -- under less pressure.

There is a history here which General Pasha spoke very frankly about at our lunch when he said, quite bluntly, to the senators assembled and those of us who were privileged to be there that we have to remember that this had originally been a joint Pakistani-American intelligence operation in the 1980s.

And when the United States walked out on Afghanistan in 1989, which history will record as a very serious error, the Pakistanis were left with a situation which required them, from their own point of view, to continue some of these relationships.

It made sense in 1989.  It made no sense after 9/11, from our point of view.  But many people think the Pakistanis are still ambivalent about it, and many people in the region -- indeed, the bulk of the people in the region -- as all of you know, believe the United States will abandon them again because of the history.

One of the things that this administration has tried to do is say we're not going to walk out this time.  But words have to be measured against history, and the history has left them skeptical, and we need to show the region -- which is again why this legislation has become so important.

I mean, I -- I -- I want to be very frank with you.  The phrase "Kerry-Lugar" has a talismanic quality in the Pakistani press now. It's not just the amount of money.  It's the fact that it is now read as a symbol of our intentions to stick around and be serious about it.

And of course, the troop commitment in Afghanistan speaks for itself.

FEINGOLD:  Mr. Ambassador, my time's out.  I just want to make sure I get an answer to the -- to the larger question.

Are you sure that the troop buildup in Afghanistan will not be counterproductive vis-a-vis Pakistan?

HOLBROOKE:  No.  I'm only sure that we are aware of the problem, that we are working intensely with the Pakistani army, that they are aware of it, that the lesson of 2001, 2002 has been absorbed.

But everyone who's observed the situation from the outside has come to the same conclusion, Senator Feingold, and that is that there are not enough forces in the west.  And this -- this offensive will drive pressure into Baluchistan, where the fighting now is to the north and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

We hope that the Pakistanis will move more troops into the west, improve the training of the Frontier Corps.  We're ready to assist with all of this.  It is imperative that it be done.  It is a -- it is an extraordinarily complicated equation.

Why then would I still support the troop buildup in Afghanistan, which I strongly support for the simplest of reasons?  It is – you could not leave the American, the NATO and the ISAF forces in the deployment structure which was inherited on January 20th.  We did not have enough forces ourselves to do our own job.

So the recommendation of General Petraeus and General McKiernan for an additional 17,000 troops and 4,000 trainers was, in my view, absolutely critical.  But yes, we're aware of the consequence.  And I would say, quite candidly, that wasn't true seven years ago.

KERRY:  An honest answer.  Thank you.