

109TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

**S. RES. 460**

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should increase its support to the people of Somalia in their efforts to end decades of violence, establish lasting peace, form a democratically elected and stable central government, and become an effective partner in eradicating radicalism and terrorism from their country and the region.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. COLEMAN (for himself and Mr. FEINGOLD) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on

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**RESOLUTION**

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should increase its support to the people of Somalia in their efforts to end decades of violence, establish lasting peace, form a democratically elected and stable central government, and become an effective partner in eradicating radicalism and terrorism from their country and the region.

Whereas General Mohamed Siad Barre, who came to power in Somalia through a military coup in 1969, was ousted from power by several armed groups of Somalia in 1991;

Whereas, following the collapse of the central authority in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, rival groups of Somalia devastated the region by—

(1) engaging in an armed struggle for personal political power; and

(2) preventing food and medicine from reaching innocent civilians who were suffering from drought and famine;

Whereas, during the continued internal chaos and destruction in Somalia, hundreds of thousands of people have died from—

(1) violence;

(2) starvation; and

(3) disease;

Whereas the people of Somalia witnessed the country splinter into—

(1) the Republic of Somaliland, which—

(A) is located in the northwest portion of Somalia; and

(B) seeks independence;

(2) Puntland, which is an autonomous region located in the northeast portion of Somalia; and

(3) a myriad of warlord-controlled fiefdoms that are located in the southern portion of Somalia;

Whereas, on November 9, 1992, President George H. W. Bush authorized Operation Restore Hope, and used the Armed Forces to safeguard nongovernmental organizations while the organizations attempted to provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering civilian population of Somalia;

Whereas the United States led the Unified Task Force (referred to in this preamble as the “UNITAF”) in an effort to—

(1) save lives; and

(2) help create a relatively peaceful environment for humanitarian activity in Somalia;

Whereas, in May 1993, UNITAF handed its operations to the United Nations for an operation subsequently known as the “United Nations Operation in Somalia”, giving the people of Somalia hope for peace and stability;

Whereas the operation was unfortunately unsuccessful in establishing peace and stability in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

Whereas, in March 1994, the Armed Forces withdrew from Somalia after a long and bloody battle in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993;

Whereas, 1 year after the withdrawal of the United States, the United Nations withdrew all remaining peacekeepers because the security conditions in Somalia had further deteriorated;

Whereas the United Nations withdrew United Nations troops from Somalia in 1995;

Whereas 13 conferences dedicated to promoting reconciliation or peace have been called in order to end the fighting in Somalia;

Whereas, in October 2002, 21 warring parties in Somalia took positive action by—

(1) agreeing to a cease fire under the auspices of the East African organization known as the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development”; and

(2) beginning a dialogue that was focused on forming a government;

Whereas, in September 2003, the parties to the Kenyan peace process agreed on the Transitional National Char-

ter for Somalia, and thus paved the way for the creation of a unified national government in Somalia;

Whereas, in August 2004, the 275-member Transitional Federal Assembly of Somalia was assembled in Kenya to reunify and heal Somalia and comprised of 61 delegates from the 4 major clans of Somalia and 31 delegates from an alliance of minority clans located in that country;

Whereas Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the former leader of Puntland, was elected President of Somalia by the Transitional Federal Government on October 10, 2004;

Whereas Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed appointed Professor Ali Mohamed Gedi as Prime Minister in November 2004;

Whereas a limited number of countries on the continent of Africa have pledged to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia to help protect the Transitional Federal Government as the Government seeks to reestablish peace and order;

Whereas the international community should encourage those individuals and organizations that have shown commitment to the peace process, including—

- (1) the African Union;
- (2) the Intergovernmental Authority on Development;
- (3) the Transitional Federal Government; and
- (4) the many clans located in Somalia;

Whereas escalating tensions and violence between certain clans threaten to weaken the ability of the Transitional Federal Government to—

- (1) develop capacity;
- (2) effectively establish stability; and
- (3) enforce the rule of law throughout Somalia;

Whereas the 2004 Country Reports on Terrorism, produced by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f), noted that—

(1) “a small number of al-Qa’ida operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continue to pose the most serious threat to American interests in the region”;

(2) “Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula make it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point to conduct operations elsewhere”; and

(3) “[t]he U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power”;

Whereas current political tensions may be exacerbated by the ongoing humanitarian crisis that continues to affect hundreds of thousands of individuals in Somalia, thereby making the task of creating a stable, central government increasingly difficult;

Whereas the Transitional Federal Government is incapable of meeting the fundamental needs of all people of Somalia, including—

- (1) education;
- (2) health care; and
- (3) other essential services;

Whereas the 2005 Human Rights Report published by the Department of State cites significant concerns relating to abuses of human rights in Somalia, including—

- (1) female genital mutilation;
- (2) rape; and
- (3) political violence;

Whereas the Federal Government has provided \$476,000,000 for humanitarian assistance activities since 1990, although a majority of those funds were distributed during the early 1990s;

Whereas it is the desire of the United States that the people of Somalia live peaceful, stable, prosperous, and happy lives;

Whereas the United States has historically supported the aspirations of the people of Somalia; and

Whereas the compassion of the citizens of the United States extends across the world to embrace every member of the human family: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

2               (1) the United States is working with the peo-  
3       ple of Somalia to build a stable and enduring demo-  
4       cratic nation in the Horn of Africa that is pros-  
5       perous and free of civil war;

6               (2) to achieve long-lasting peace in the region,  
7       the nascent leadership and governance structures of  
8       Somalia must—

9               (A) commit themselves to the principles of  
10       democracy and the rule of law; and

11              (B) pledge to hold popular elections as  
12       soon as Somalia has stabilized;

1           (3) the nascent Transitional Federal Govern-  
2           ment for Somalia should—

3           (A) organize itself in 1 city as soon as  
4           practicable to—

5           (i) promote national unity; and

6           (ii) begin the process of reentering the  
7           international community; and

8           (B) delay the consideration of the delicate  
9           issue regarding the Republic of Somaliland  
10          until an appropriate level of stability has been  
11          achieved in Somalia, while understanding the  
12          critical importance of that issue for establishing  
13          a peaceful Somalia;

14          (4) the President should—

15          (A) commend the efforts of those that have  
16          worked to restore a functioning and inter-  
17          nationally recognized government in Somalia,  
18          including—

19                 (i) the people of Somalia and their  
20                 representatives;

21                 (ii) the African Union;

22                 (iii) the Intergovernmental Authority  
23                 on Development;

24                 (iv) friendly countries from the con-  
25                 tinent of Africa; and

- 1 (v) nongovernmental organizations;
- 2 (B) through the Secretary of State, de-
- 3 velop a comprehensive interagency stabilization
- 4 and reconstruction strategy that—
- 5 (i) aligns humanitarian, develop-
- 6 mental, economic, political,
- 7 counterterrorism, and regional strategies;
- 8 (ii) achieves the objectives of the
- 9 United States in Somalia in coordination
- 10 with the international donor community;
- 11 and
- 12 (iii) orients current and future pro-
- 13 grams to meet the objectives described in
- 14 clause (ii);
- 15 (C) appoint a special envoy to Somalia
- 16 to—
- 17 (i) help guide and inform United
- 18 States policy and interests in the region;
- 19 and
- 20 (ii) serve as a liaison between—
- 21 (I) the United States;
- 22 (II) nascent Somali governance
- 23 institutions;
- 24 (III) the international donor
- 25 community; and

1 (IV) the region;

2 (D) instruct the United States Permanent  
3 Representative to the United Nations to request  
4 that the Security Council take additional meas-  
5 ures to—

6 (i) evaluate the effectiveness of the ex-  
7 isting arms embargo on Somalia; and

8 (ii) develop an improved plan to mon-  
9 itor and protect the vast land and mari-  
10 time borders of Somalia from—

11 (I) smuggling;

12 (II) dumping; and

13 (III) piracy; and

14 (E) through the Secretaries of State and  
15 the Treasury, work with international financial  
16 institutions to incrementally reduce the crip-  
17 pling international debt of Somalia on the con-  
18 dition that Somalia upholds democratic and free  
19 market principles;

20 (5) the United States Agency for International  
21 Development should increase the assistance that the  
22 Agency provides to the Transitional Federal Govern-  
23 ment to rebuild the national infrastructure of Soma-  
24 lia, and place particular emphasis on the promotion  
25 of the governmental institutions of Somalia;

1           (6) the United States should provide training  
2 and support to the Transitional National Govern-  
3 ment of Somalia to—

4           (A) fight terrorism and extremism; and

5           (B) strengthen the civil society and grass-  
6 roots efforts in Somalia that will deny terrorist  
7 and extremist groups a fertile ground for re-  
8 cruitment in that country;

9           (7) the United States, in partnership with the  
10 United Nations and the international donor commu-  
11 nity, must—

12           (A) heed the calls concerning the signifi-  
13 cant drought affecting the region that have  
14 been placed by—

15           (i) the United Nations Coordinator  
16 for Humanitarian Assistance;

17           (ii) the international community of  
18 nongovernmental organizations; and

19           (iii) regional governments;

20           (B) provide sufficient humanitarian assist-  
21 ance to those impacted by the drought; and

22           (C) realize that a failure to address the hu-  
23 manitarian emergency could have a negative im-  
24 pact on fragile political developments; and

1           (8) not later than 180 days after the date of  
2           enactment of this resolution, the Secretary of State  
3           should present to Congress a status report on items  
4           referred to in paragraphs (4) through (8) that in-  
5           cludes—

6                   (A) a projection of future challenges re-  
7                   garding Somalia; and

8                   (B) resource requirements that could  
9                   foreseeably be needed to continue to support  
10                  the transition of Somalia to a peaceful and  
11                  democratic country.